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Abstract. This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms have a choice
to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We model CSR as an invest-
ment to increase product differentiation that allows firms to benefit from higher profit
margins. The model predicts that CSR decreases systematic risk and increases firm value
and that these effects are stronger for firms with high product differentiation. We find
supporting evidence for our predictions. We address a potential endogeneity problem by
instrumenting CSR using data on the political affiliation of the firm’s home state.
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1. Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has long been a
strategic concern for corporations around the world,
responding to the interest shown by both consumers
and investors.1 Commenting on the significant pres-
sure from stakeholders to adopt CSR policies, the
Economist concluded already in 2008 (Franklin 2008,
p. 13) that “Company after company has been shaken
into adopting a CSR policy: it is almost unthinkable
today for a big global corporation to be without one.”
Arguably, CSR’s increased popularity inside board-
rooms has outpaced the research needed to justify it.
Specifically, the mechanisms through which CSR may
affect firm value are not fully understood. In this paper,
we aim to close this gap and address the following
questions: Does CSR affect systematic risk (as hypoth-
esized by Bénabou and Tirole 2010)? How is firm value
affected? Is the effect of CSR on firm risk and value
different across firms?
We develop an industry equilibrium model where
firms choose to adopt a CSR or a non-CSR produc-
tion technology and embed the choice of technology
within a standard asset-pricing framework. Firms are
heterogenous in their adoption cost of the CSR tech-
nology, so that firms with lower costs are more likely
to do it. We model the adoption of CSR technology
as a firm’s investment to increase product differenti-
ation. This interpretation is consistent with an exten-
sive marketing and economics literature, which we dis-
cuss in the related literature section. In the model, a
CSR firm faces a relatively less price-elastic demand,
resulting in higher profit margins and product prices,
ceteris paribus. Importantly, higher profit margins also
lead to a lower elasticity of profits to aggregate shocks.
From the perspective of a risk-averse investor, a firm
exhibiting a lower elasticity of profits to aggregate
shocks has lower systematic risk and has a higher
firm value. However, higher profit margins lead more
firms to adopt CSR policies and to pay higher costs.
These higher adoption costs increase systematic risk
and lower market value for the marginal firm. This
industry-equilibrium feedback effect contrasts with the
first partial-equilibrium risk-reduction benefit of CSR.
We show that the relative strength of these two ef-
fects and, thus, the relative riskiness of CSR firms de-
pend on consumers’ expenditure share on CSR goods.
A sufficiently small expenditure share on CSR goods
limits the proportion of CSR firms and implies that
the marginal CSR firm has lower systematic risk and
higher valuation than non-CSR firms. Assuming small
enough expenditure share on CSR goods, the two
main model predictions are that CSR firms have lower
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systematic risk and higher firm value and that these
effects are larger in firms with lower price elasticity of
demand or greater product differentiation.
We test the model predictions using a comprehen-
sive data set on firm-level CSR from MSCI’s ESG Re-
search database. The sample consists of a panel of U.S.
firms from 2003 to 2015 with a total of 28,578 firm-
year observations. We construct an overall CSR score
that combines information on the firm’s performance
across community, diversity, employee relations, envi-
ronment, product, and human rights attributes. We
estimate firm systematic risk using the CAPMmodel as
in our theory. Using the estimated betas as our depen-
dent variable, we run panel regressions with time and
industry fixed effects and with control variables that
are known to affect systematic risk.
We first document that the level of systematic risk
is statistically and economically significantly lower for
firms with a higher CSR score. One standard deviation
increase in firm CSR score is associated with a firm
beta that is 1% lower relative to beta’s sample mean.
Next, we proxy product differentiation with advertis-
ing expenditures and find that the economic magni-
tude of the effect of CSR on firm beta is about 40%
stronger for a firm with an average level of advertising
spending relative to a firm without advertising spend-
ing. We then analyze the effect of CSR on firm value,
proxied by Tobin’s Q. Consistent with the model, the
association between Tobin’s Q and CSR is positive and
stronger for firms with greater product differentiation.
We find that the economic magnitude of the effect of
CSR on firm value is about 20% stronger for a firmwith
an average level of advertising spending relative to a
firm without advertising spending.
There are reasons to suspect that endogeneity may
be an issue in our empirical specifications. A firm’s
financial resources may determine its CSR decisions
(Hong et al. 2012), or firms that differentiate their prod-
ucts through other means, such as branding, and thus
have lower systematic risk, might also invest more in
CSR. To address these concerns, we use a compre-
hensive set of control variables that includes cash and
advertising expenses in addition to time and industry
fixed effects. In addition, we conduct an instrumental
variables (IV) estimation taking as instrument the polit-
ical affiliation of the state where the company’s head-
quarters’ are located following a literature that sug-
gests that democratic-leaning voters care more about
CSR (Gromet et al. 2013, Costa and Kahn 2013, Di Giuli
and Kostovetsky 2014). The IV regression results are
consistent with our baseline panel data results.
Finally, we also document that profits for firms with
a high CSR score are less correlated with the busi-
ness cycle than the profits for firms with a low CSR
score. This finding provides supporting evidence for
ourmain result that CSR leads to lower systematic risk.
Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3
presents the model, and Section 4 analyzes the equi-
librium properties regarding risk and firm value. Sec-
tion 5 presents the data and the results are in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
2. Related Literature
One of our main contributions is the development of
a theory to study the relationship between CSR and
firm risk when firms respond to consumers’ prefer-
ences and to put the analysis into an industry equi-
librium framework. This paper belongs to a literature
asserting that firms engage in profit-maximizing CSR
(McWilliams and Siegel 2001).2 In particular, we draw
from the research that argues that CSR is a prod-
uct differentiation strategy (Navarro 1988, Bagnoli and
Watts 2003, Siegel and Vitaliano 2007). Consistent with
this literature, Luo and Bhattacharya (2006, 2009) have
argued that CSR increases customer loyalty, leading
to firms having more pricing power. Direct evidence
for this is observed in the ability of firms to sell more
or at higher prices those products that have CSR fea-
tures (see e.g., Creyer and Ross 1997, Auger et al. 2003,
Pelsmacker et al. 2005, Elfenbein and McManus 2010,
Elfenbein et al. 2012, Ailawadi et al. 2014, Hilger et al.
2018). Flammer (2015a) provides indirect evidence for
CSR as a product differentiation strategy by show-
ing that U.S. firms respond to tariff reductions that
increase competition by increasing their CSR activities.
In our empirical analysis, we use advertising expendi-
tures as a proxy for product differentiation and show
that our results are stronger when advertising expen-
ditures are high. There is a long history in marketing
and economics of thinking of advertising as a product
differentiation strategy (see e.g., Bain 1956). Comanor
and Wilson (1979) conclude in the review of empiri-
cal evidence on advertising that advertising has con-
tributed to market power and, thus, enabled higher
profit margins.
Our other main contribution is the empirical eval-
uation of the CSR–firm risk relationship. While there
is a recent empirical literature documenting a nega-
tive association between CSR and firm risk and cost of
equity capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al. 2012, Oikonomou
et al. 2012), these papers do not claim a causal rela-
tionship. We contribute to this literature by conducting
an instrumental variables estimation and by present-
ing further evidence on the nature of the relationship
across firms as predicted by the model.
CSR has received scant attention in the theoretical
finance literature. A notable exception is Heinkel et al.
(2001), who assume that some investors choose not to
invest in non-CSR stocks. This market segmentation
leads to higher expected returns and risk for non-CSR
stocks, which must be held by only a fraction of the
investors (as in Errunza and Losq 1985, and Merton
1987). Gollier and Pouget (2014) build a model where
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socially responsible investors can take over non-CSR
companies and create value by turning those into CSR
companies but offer no prediction for firm systematic
risk. These papers assume that a subset of investors
have a preference for CSR stocks. As pointed out by
Starks (2009), investors seem to care more about cor-
porate governance than about CSR, and as noted by
Hayward et al. (2013), CEOs seem to care more about
consumers when they make their CSR choices. We use
the model to make predictions regarding the role of
consumers in affecting the CSR–risk relationship across
industries, and we test these predictions empirically.
We are, therefore, able to provide evidence consistent
with the main mechanism in the theory.
Our paper is also related to the work on intangible
assets and firm risk. Belo et al. (2014) find that firms
with higher investments in brand capital, measured by
advertising expenditures, exhibit lower stock returns.
Gourio and Rudanko (2014) provide a model with
search frictions in the product markets where firms
spend resources in acquiring customers. The acquired
customer base becomes a valuable asset increasing firm
value and profit margins. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou
(2013) argue that firms with talented employees (high
organizational capital) are riskier because key employ-
ees have a claim on cash flows that varies systemati-
cally. Larkin (2013) shows that firms with high brand
perception have higher debt capacity, consistent with
the view that brand value lowers firm risk. Lins et al.
(2017) show that firms with high social capital, mea-
sured as CSR rating, had considerably higher stock
returns during the financial crisis, implying that CSR
activities are a risk management tool.
There is a large empirical literature on the associa-
tion between CSR and firm value. Margolis et al. (2010)
review 35 years of evidence and show that there is
on average a small positive effect. Servaes and Tamayo
(2013) provide evidence that there is a positive rela-
tionship between CSR and firm value when customers
have high awareness of firm activities. Servaes and
Tamayo (2013) use advertising expenditures as a proxy
for awareness, and their results are consistent with
ours. Krüger (2015) finds a negative effect on stock
prices if management is likely to receive private ben-
efits from CSR adoption but a positive effect if CSR
policies are adopted to improve relations with stake-
holders. Flammer (2015b) studies shareholder propos-
als for CSR that pass or fail with a small margin
of votes and shows that approved proposals lead to
positive abnormal stock returns. Dimson et al. (2015)
find that institutional investor activism that leads to
changes in firms’ CSR policies are followed by positive
abnormal stock returns, especially in industries that
are likely to be consumer-oriented industries. Deng
et al. (2013) show that acquirers with high CSR scores
experience higher merger announcement returns and
better post-merger operating performance. Edmans
(2011) shows that firms with high employee satisfac-
tion have higher valuations.
While the majority of recent studies has demon-
strated economic benefits fromCSR, Cheng et al. (2013)
and Masulis and Reza (2015) provide evidence that
an increase in effective managerial ownership leads
to a decrease in CSR activities and corporate giv-
ing, consistent with the agency cost view of CSR.
Both studies measure the marginal effect of changing
after-tax ownership on CSR and, thus, do not show
that on average CSR activities destroy value. Inter-
estingly, Ferrell et al. (2016) show that well governed
firms engage more in CSR activities and that CSR
activities are positively associated with executive pay–
performance sensitivity. The evidence in Ferrell et al.
(2016) is difficult to reconcile with the view that CSR is
largely motivated by managers’ personal benefits.
3. The Model
3.1. The Model Setup
Consider an economy with a representative investor
and a continuum of firms with unit mass. There are
two dates, 1 and 2.
3.1.1. Household Sector. The representative investor
has preferences
U(C1 ,C2)
C1−γ1
1− γ + δE
[
C1−γ2
1− γ
]
. (1)
The relative risk aversion coefficient is γ > 0, and the
parameter δ < 1 is the rate of time preference. The
expectations operator is denoted by E[ · ]. There are two
types of goods in the economy. Low elasticity of sub-
stitution goods, which we associate with goods pro-
duced by socially responsible firms (CSR goods), and
high elasticity of substitution goods, which we asso-
ciate with other firms (non-CSR goods). We label these
using the subscripts G and P, respectively, for green
and polluting. A convenient analytical way to model
differences in the elasticity of substitution across goods
is to use the Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator,
C2 
(∫ µ
0
cσGi di
)α/σG (∫ 1
µ
cσPi di
) (1−α)/σP
.
Accordingly, 0 < σ j < 1 is the elasticity of substitution
within c j , j  G,P goods. A lower elasticity of sub-
stitution implies lower price elasticity of demand and
a more “loyal” demand. We, therefore, are interested
in the case σG < σP .3 The parameter α is the share of
expenditures allocated to CSR goods and is exogenous.
In the context of our representative agentmodel, α cap-
tures the market size for CSR goods.4 The variable µ
measures the fraction of CSR firms and is determined
in equilibrium.
Investor optimization is subject to two budget con-
straints. At date 1, the investor is endowed with stocks
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and with cash W1 > 0 expressed in units of the aggre-
gate good. The investor decides on the date 1 con-
sumption, C1; stock holdings, Di ; and the total amount
of lending to firms, B, subject to the date 1 budget
constraint,∫ 1
0
Qi di +W1 ≥ C1 +
∫ 1
0
QiDi di + B, (2)
and given the stock prices Qi and the interest rate r.
The investor decides on the date 2 consumption, ci ,
subject to the budget constraint
W2 ≡
∫
Di(pii − Fi) di +wL+ B(1+ r) ≥
∫
pici di. (3)
In the budget constraint, pii is the operating profit gen-
erated by firm i, and Fi is a cash outlay to be specified
later so that pii − Fi is the net profit, and in this static
model, it is also the liquidation payoff. Consumer’s
wealth at date 2 is denoted byW2, w is the wage rate, L
is the amount of labor inelastically supplied, and pi is
the price of good i. The investor behaves competitively
and takes prices as given.
3.1.2. Production Sector. At date 1, firms choose
which production technology to invest in. The deci-
sion is based on expected operating profitability and
fixed adoption costs. Each firm is endowed with a
technology-adoption cost. Firm i faces a cost of τGi if it
chooses to invest in the CSR technology or a cost τP > 0
if it chooses the non-CSR technology. The distribution
of costs τGi across firms is uniform and takes values
between 0 and 1. Firm i finances τi by raising debt Bi
and, therefore, has zero cash flow at date 1.5
Date 2 operating profits depend on the price elastic-
ity of demand.We interpret choosing the G technology
as a product differentiation strategy because σG < σP
implies that G firms have more pricing power, ceteris
paribus. Note that a higher cost τGi does not translate
into a higher benefit for CSR firms. Instead, all CSR
firms have access to the same elasticity of substitu-
tion, σG. This assumption captures the idea that CSR
adoption is not equally costly to all firms.
At date 2, firm iG,P chooses howmuch to produce
of its good, xi to maximize operating profits. Firms act
as monopolistic competitors, solving
pii max
xi
{pi(xi)xi −wli}, (4)
subject to the equilibrium inverse demand function
pi(xi) as well as the constant returns to scale produc-
tion technology,
li Axi . (5)
Production of one unit of output requires A units of
labor input.6 The aggregate productivity shock, A, is
realized at date 2 before production takes place. The
productivity shock changes the number of labor units
needed to produce consumption goods, and thus, high
productivity is characterized by low values of A. The
shock A is assumed to have bounded support in the
positive real numbers.
Net profits for a non-CSR firm are piP − τP(1 + r)
whereas net profits for a CSR firm are piG − τGi(1+ r),
assuming that CSR firms finance the adoption cost at
date 1 by raising debt Bi and, therefore, have zero cash
flow at date 1.
3.1.3. Market Clearing. At date 1, asset markets clear,
Di  1, for all i, and B  ∫10 Bi di. At date 2, goods mar-
kets clear, xi  ci , for all i, and the labor market clears,
∫10 li di  L.
3.2. Equilibrium
We start by solving the equilibrium at date 2.
3.2.1. Date 2 Equilibrium. Let µ ∈ (0, 1) denote the frac-
tion of CSR firms determined in date 1. The outcome of
the date 2 equilibrium is given as a function of µ. The
appendix shows that the demand functions for CSR
goods and non-CSR goods are, respectively,
cl  α
p1/(σG−1)l∫ µ
0 p
σG/(σG−1)
i di
W2 , (6)
ck  (1− α)
p1/(σP−1)k∫ 1
µ
pσP/(σP−1)i di
W2. (7)
Firm l’s demand elasticity equals −1/(1 − σl). Thus, a
lower elasticity of substitution (lower σl) is associated
with a demand that is less sensitive to price fluctua-
tions and is, therefore, more loyal.
Firms act as a monopolistic competitors and choose
xi according to Equation (4) subject to the inverse
demand functions pi(xi) derived from (6) or (7). The
first-order conditions are
σGpl  wA, σPpk  wA.
The second-order condition for each firm is met
because 0 < σ j < 1. Using these first-order conditions,
we get the optimal value of operating profits,
pi j  (1− σ j)p jx j . (8)
Goods with lower elasticity of substitution σ j , that is,
goods with more loyal demand, allow producers to
extract higher profits per unit of revenue, all else equal.
It is possible to construct models where increases in
demand shift the profit margin (for example with
Cournot oligopoly), but in our model, the profit mar-
gin is directly tied to the elasticity of substitution and
hence to CSR.
To solve for the equilibrium, Walras’ law requires
that a price normalization be imposed. We impose that
the price of the aggregate consumption good is time
invariant, so its price at date 2 equals the price at date 1,
which is 1. This normalization imposes an implicit
constraint on prices pl , 1  minci∈{ci :C21} ∫10 pici di. The
price normalization implies that W2  ∫ plcl dl  C2,
from which we obtain the usual condition that the
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marginal utility of date 2 wealth with constant relative
risk aversion preferences equals C−γ2 . The next proposi-
tion describes the date 2 equilibrium as a function of µ.
The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 1. For any interior value of µ and any aggre-
gate shock A, a symmetric date 2 equilibrium exists and is
unique with goods prices, pP  p¯,
pG  p¯
σP
σG
,
consumption,
cG 
σG
σP
x¯
α
µ
A−1 ,
cP  x¯
1− α
1− µA
−1 ,
wage rate, w  p¯A−1σP , operating profits,
piG  p¯ x¯(1− σG)αµA
−1 ,
piP  p¯ x¯(1− σP)1− α1− µA
−1 ,
and marginal utility of wealth, λ [p¯ x¯]−γAγ, where p¯ , x¯ > 0
are functions of exogenous parameters given in the appendix.
In equilibrium, a higher productivity shock (lo-
wer A) increases the demand for labor and, thus,
also increases the wage rate. Prices are constant with
respect to the aggregate shock, and there is a CSR-price
premium, pG > pP , because σG < σP .
3.2.2. Date 1 Equilibrium. To solve for the date 1
equilibrium, we need to determine the rate used by
the representative investor to discount future profits.
Imposing the equilibrium conditions, the date 1 budget
constraint gives C1 W1 − B so that the inter-temporal
marginal rate of substitution, or stochastic discount fac-
tor, becomes
m ≡ δ
(
C2
C1
)−γ
 m¯[p¯ x¯]−γAγ , (9)
where m¯  δ(W1 − B)γ. States of the world with low
productivity (high A) and, therefore, low consump-
tion, have higher marginal utility of consumption and
higher m.
The date 1 equilibrium has the familiar pricing con-
ditions for bonds,
1 E[m(1+ r)], (10)
and for stocks,
Qi  E[mpii] − τi . (11)
Firms choice problem is to solve max{QG ,QP}.
In equilibrium, if there is an interior solution for µ,
thenQ j ≥ 0 and the price of the marginal CSR firm,Q∗G,
has to equal the price of the non-CSR firm, QP  Q∗G.
This equality determines the cutoff cost τ∗G at which the
marginal firm is indifferent between investing or not
investing in CSR:
E[mpiG] − τ∗G  E[mpiP] − τP . (12)
At an interior solution for µ, infra-marginal CSR firms
with τGi < τ∗G have stock prices higher thanQ
∗
G because
piG is equal for all CSR firms. At a corner solution with
µ  1, QP ≤ QG for all τG. At a corner solution with
µ  0, QP ≥QG for all τG. Given an equilibrium thresh-
old level τ∗G, the equilibrium mass of CSR firms is µ 
∫τ∗G0 di  τ∗G.
It is immediate then that firm-level CSR is associated
with higher firm value. In equilibrium QP Q∗G so that
firm values are equal for the marginal CSR firm and
all non-CSR firms. Because the value of the marginal
CSR firm is Q∗G  E(mpiG) − τ∗G and infra-marginal CSR
firms have lower costs of adopting the CSR technology,
the net benefits of CSR adoption are higher for those
firms. Thus, firm values have to be higher for the infra-
marginal firms, that is, QGi  E(mpiG) − τGi ≥ Q∗G QP .
We test this prediction in Section 6.4.
We are unable to show analytically existence of
date 1 equilibrium for µ.7 The next proposition offers
a characterization of the solution when an equilibrium
exists and states that the proportion of CSR firms is
related to the expenditure share on CSR goods.
Proposition 2. At an interior equilibrium for µ, the pro-
portion of CSR firms in the industry is µ < τP iff α < α¯,
where
α¯ 
(1− σP)τP
1− σG − τP(σP − σG) .
Moreover, the constant α¯ is increasing in σG and α¯ < τP iff
σP > σG.
The constant α¯ is the expenditure share at which
µ  τP . Any expenditure share α < α¯ leads to a pro-
portion µ < τP . A more loyal demand for CSR firms,
σP > σG, implies that the threshold expenditure share
α¯ < τP . Intuitively, if σP > σG, then CSR firms are able to
extract higher rents for the same expenditure share α,
and the proportion of CSR firms grows. To place an
upper bound on µ, a sufficiently smaller expenditure
share α is required.
4. CSR and Risk in Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the properties of CSR firms’
risk. For simplicity, we use the notation α j  α if j  G,
and α j  1 − α if j  P. Likewise, µ j  µ if j  G, and
µ j  1− µ if j  P.
4.1. Profitability and Aggregate Shocks
We start by describing the properties of date 2 net prof-
its in response to aggregate shocks. Consider the elas-
ticity of net profits to the aggregate shock for a generic
firm j:
d ln(pi j − τ j(1+ r))
d lnA−1 
η¯p¯ x¯(1− σ j)(α j/µ j)A−1
p¯ x¯(1− σ j)(α j/µ j)A−1 − τ j(1+ r) .
Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang: Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk
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We compute the elasticity with respect to A−1 so that
the elasticity is positive (recall that a high value of A−1
corresponds to an economic upturn.) The sensitivity of
firms’ profits to aggregate shocks depends on the price
elasticity of demand. To see this, consider the partial
equilibrium effect that lower σ j has on the sensitivity
of profits to aggregate shocks holding µ constant. The
partial derivative with respect to σ j is positive, imply-
ing that a firm facing a lower price elasticity of demand
has profits that are less sensitive to aggregate shocks.
The intuition for the result is that more product dif-
ferentiation generates greater profit margins for the
firm, which dilute the effect of the technology adop-
tion costs. This partial equilibrium result captures the
widely held view that a less price elastic demand gives
the firm the ability to smooth out aggregate fluctu-
ations better. Similarly, profits are more sensitive to
aggregate shocks when the costs τ j are high.
The next proposition extends this partial equilib-
rium result by considering the equilibrium implica-
tions of productivity shocks on the net profits of CSR
and non-CSR firms.
Proposition 3. Define the ratio of net profits evaluated at
the marginal CSR firm:
Rpi ≡
piG − τ∗G(1+ r)
piP − τP(1+ r) .
Rpi > 1 and is increasing with A iff α < α¯. Also, piG < piP iff
α < α¯.
For a sufficiently small expenditure share in CSR,
α < α¯; that is, for µ < τP , firms that choose the CSR
technology have profits that are less sensitive to pro-
ductivity shocks than those of non-CSR firms. That is,
net profits of CSR firms relative to the profits of non-
CSR firms are countercyclical. This result is supported
by the evidence in Lins et al. (2017) showing that CSR
firms experienced higher profitability than non-CSR
firms during the financial crisis (see also Cornett et al.
2016). It is interesting to contrast this result with the
prediction from the alternative view that CSR goods
are superior goods. Under this alternative view, CSR
firms are riskier because their profits co-movemorewith
the business cycle, when income is high, than non-CSR
firms’ profits.
The model also predicts that operating profits of
CSR firms are lower than operating profits of non-CSR
firms; that is, piG < piP iff α < α¯, consistent with the evi-
dence in Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014). It is impor-
tant to note that while operating profits are lower for
CSR firms, net profits are larger; that is, piG−τG(1+ r)>
piP − τP(1+ r)when α < α¯.
4.2. CSR and Systematic Risk
To see how the results on profits translate to systematic
risk, define the gross return to firm j as the ratio of its
net profits to its stock price, 1+ r j ≡ (pi j − τ j(1+ r))/Q j .
Also, define the value-weighted market return as 1 +
rM ≡∫ ωi(1+ ri) diwith ωi ≡Qi/∫Q j dj. In our empirical
tests, we measure systematic risk with respect to the
market return.
Proposition 4. Consider firm j’s market β j Cov(r j , rM)/
Var(rM). We have
β j 
(1− σ j)α j
(1− σG)α+ (1− σP)(1− α)
1
µ jω j
.
At an interior solution for µ, βP > β∗G iff α¯ > α. Keeping µ
constant, β j increases with σ j .
This proposition compares the level of systematic risk
between CSR and non-CSR firms. Consider an equilib-
rium where the fraction of CSR firms is not too large,
that is, µ ≤ τP (or α ≤ α¯). In such an equilibrium, the
marginal CSR firm has lower β than a non-CSR firm.
In addition, because Q j ≥ Q∗G for any infra-marginal
CSR firm j, then β j ≤ β∗G. Therefore, if µ ≤ τP , then the
average CSR firm has lower market β than the aver-
age non-CSR firm. Now consider an equilibriumwhere
the fraction of CSR firms is sufficiently large, that is,
µ > τP . When µ > τP (or α > α¯), the marginal CSR
firm has higher market β than non-CSR firms. The rea-
son is that when the proportion of CSR firms is larger,
the marginal CSR firm has high technology adoption
costs and high profit sensitivity to aggregate shocks
and, hence, high systematic risk. Moreover, lower val-
ues of σ j , lead to lower β j .8
We test this prediction by regressing firm-level sys-
tematic risk on the firm’s CSR attributes, controlling for
known determinants of systematic risk. In addition, we
interact CSR with advertising expenditures to test the
prediction that CSR-firm betas are lower when there is
greater product differentiation. Our model predictions
and tests are thus complementary to the hypothesis
studied in Servaes and Tamayo (2013) stating that CSR
has a positive impact on firm value when customer
awareness is high. We argue that the link they find of
CSR and firm value is at least partly explained via the
level of systematic risk.
While our model predictions build on lower price
elasticity of demand, we do not differentiate between
consumer industries and business-to-business indus-
tries in testing our model (other than controlling for
industry fixed effects) because consumers are aware
of firms’ supply chains, which creates an incentive for
firms in other industries to also engage in CSR. That
is, consumers demand better CSR policies from the
firms they buy from and from the firms that supply to
these firms. For example, according to Fortune maga-
zine, Apple has become one of the most proactive IT
companies in China, demanding higher environmental
standards from its key suppliers (Lashinsky 2013).
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5. Data Description
Our firm-level CSR data is from the MSCI’s ESG Re-
search database, formerly known as KLD Research and
Analytics, and ranges from 2003 to 2015.9 The ratings
aim to capture social, environmental, and corporate
governance factors that are relevant to a firm’s finan-
cial performance and its risk management. Firms are
rated on a variety of strengths and concerns on seven
attributes: community, diversity, employee relations,
environment, product, human rights, and governance.
We exclude corporate governance attributes from our
analysis to focus on nongovernance aspects of CSR.
Wemeasure CSR as the difference between the num-
ber of strengths and that of concerns for each firm-
year. Given that the number of individual concerns
and strengths in each attribute changes over time, we
construct two normalized measures of CSR to ensure
comparability.10 First, we divide both the number of
strengths and the number of concerns across all six
CSR attributes for each firm-year by the sum of the
maximum possible number of strengths and concerns
across the six attributes for each firm-year. We then
subtract the scaled concerns from the scaled strengths
to obtain CSR1. Second, following Deng et al. (2013)
and Servaes and Tamayo (2013), we divide the number
of strengths (concerns) for each firm-year across all six
CSR categories by the maximum possible number of
strengths (concerns) in all six categories for each firm-
year. We then subtract the scaled concerns from the
scaled strengths to obtainCSR2. In summary,CSR1 and
CSR2 are both bounded between −1 and 1, but while
the first imposes a common scale factor to normalize
strengths and concerns, the second allows for different
scale factors for strengths and concerns. In both cases,
scaling alleviates the concern of a changing number of
strengths and concerns over time and across firms.
We match social responsibility data with Compustat
using CUSIPs as firm identifiers. We manually check
stock ticker and company name for accuracy.Wematch
these data with stock return data from CRSP to obtain
an estimate of systematic risk. To construct an estimate
of systematic risk that proxies our model’s main vari-
able, we use the CAPM model and run the following
time series regression for every stock i in year t using
daily data:
ri , s − rs  hi + βi(rM, s − rs)+ εi , s , (13)
where ri , s is the return for stock i in day s, rs is the
one-month T-bill rate in day s transformed into a daily
rate, and rM, s is the return on the CRSP value-weighted
index in day s. The value of systematic risk for stock i
at year t is taken to be the estimated value of βi .
After matching all databases, our sample has 28,578
firm-year observations from 4,670 distinct companies.
The data contain between 1,858 and 2,791 publicly
listed U.S. companies each year. Table A.1 in the
appendix provides a detailed description of the vari-
ables used in the analysis including all control vari-
ables. Summary statistics are in panel A of Table 1.
All firm variables (except for the two CSR measures
and diversification) are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels. Panel B of Table 1 ranks the Fama–French 12
industries according to both of our CSR measures. Per-
haps not surprisingly, Consumer Nondurables ranks
very highly across both CSR measures, together with
Business Equipment and Finance. At the other end,
Chemicals and Energy rank the lowest.
6. Empirical Results
6.1. Empirical Strategy
To explain variation in firm β because of CSR, we con-
trol for other variables known to be associated with
firm systematic risk. Leverage (long-term debt to assets),
size (log of assets), and earnings variability have been
shown to affect systematic risk (e.g., Beaver et al. 1970).
McAlister et al. (2007) show that R&D expenditures
has an impact on systematic risk. Melicher and Rush
(1973) show that conglomerate firms have higher βs
than stand-alone firms. Palazzo (2012) shows that firms
with higher levels of cash holdings display higher sys-
tematic risk. Novy-Marx (2011) shows that operating
leverage predicts cross-sectional returns. In addition,
we control for advertising expenditures, CAPEX, and
state corporate tax rate. All independent variables are
lagged by one year. We also include industry fixed
effects (based on Fama–French 12 industries) to reflect
the industry equilibrium of our model and year fixed
effects. In all tests, the standard errors are two-way
clustered by firm and year to adjust for arbitrary het-
eroskedasticity, cross-sectional and time series corre-
lation (see Petersen 2009). Of the various controls, we
highlight the inclusion ofAdvertising that also may be a
part of product differentiation strategy. If product dif-
ferentiation originated only through advertising, then
we would not expect CSR to be related to risk. Like-
wise, if product differentiation arose because of the
firm’s technology (e.g., Apple or Microsoft), then con-
trolling for R&D, and CAPEX should help capture this
additional channel.
6.2. CSR and Risk
We first examine how CSR is related to firm system-
atic risk. Table 2 reports the results using panel regres-
sions. Specifications 1 and 2 report the results control-
ling for industry and year fixed effects but without firm
controls. The specifications show that the level of sys-
tematic risk is lower for firms with higher CSR scores
with a coefficient that is statistically significant at the
1% level. In specifications 3 and 4, we include firm
controls in the regression model. The coefficients on
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Firm-years Mean Std. dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max
Firm beta 28,578 1.228 0.461 0.329 0.904 1.171 1.495 2.618
Tobin’s Q 28,578 1.885 1.270 0.759 1.106 1.443 2.132 8.410
CSR1 28,578 −0.003 0.037 −0.153 −0.020 0.000 0.016 0.360
CSR2 28,578 −0.016 0.072 −0.350 −0.050 −0.010 0.014 0.614
Operating leverage 25,516 0.841 0.458 −0.547 0.665 0.924 1.054 2.435
R&D 28,578 0.035 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.481
Advertising 28,578 0.010 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.179
Leverage 28,174 0.194 0.202 0.000 0.012 0.141 0.308 0.890
CAPEX 27,901 0.043 0.056 0.000 0.009 0.025 0.054 0.322
Cash 28,282 0.461 1.229 0.001 0.031 0.101 0.336 9.577
Size 28,282 7.283 1.705 3.673 6.049 7.183 8.362 12.019
Earnings variability 25,637 1.102 1.479 0.066 0.328 0.605 1.225 9.649
Diversification 28,284 2.213 1.691 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 11.000
State tax 28,284 0.067 0.030 0.000 0.060 0.075 0.088 0.120
ROA 27,360 0.092 0.143 −0.604 0.036 0.104 0.162 0.424
GDP Growth 28,578 0.940 1.708 −3.624 0.815 1.448 1.795 2.830
President vote, Democrats 28,578 0.520 0.083 0.247 0.455 0.529 0.584 0.925
Congress, Democrats 28,578 0.584 0.294 0.000 0.278 0.700 0.821 1.000
State government, Democrats 28,578 0.516 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000
Panel B: CSR by industry
CSR1 CSR2
Industry Mean Rank Mean Rank
Consumer nondurables 0.005 1 −0.004 2
Business equipment 0.004 2 −0.001 1
Finance 0.000 3 −0.007 3
Shops −0.004 4 −0.017 4
Utilities −0.004 5 −0.025 9
Telecoms −0.004 6 −0.017 5
Healthcare −0.005 7 −0.018 6
Consumer durables −0.006 8 −0.022 7
Manufacturing −0.007 9 −0.024 8
Chemicals −0.007 10 −0.029 11
Other −0.009 11 −0.027 10
Energy −0.022 12 −0.056 12
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation,
minimum, 25th, 50th (median), and 75th percentiles and maximum) for all variables in panel A. The
appendix provides the definition of variables. The sample period is from 2004 to 2015 for firm beta and
Tobin’s Q and from 2003 to 2014 for all other variables (we lag all independent variables by one year).
All firm variables (except for the two CSR measures and diversification) are winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels. Panel B reports the average CSR scores for Fama–French 12 industries ranked by CSR1 in
descending order.
the two measures of CSR remain statistically signifi-
cant. In terms of economic significance, a one standard
deviation increase in CSR1 (CSR2) reduces β by 0.014
(0.010), which is a 1% (1%) decrease relative to the aver-
age firm beta of 1.228 (from Table 1). The control vari-
ables display the expected signs: R&D, Leverage, Cash,
and Earnings variability are positively related to system-
atic risk whereas Advertising and Size are associated
with lower systematic risk. The other controls, includ-
ing Operating leverage, CAPEX, Diversification, and State
tax are not statistically significant across specifications.
To test our main prediction of whether firm-level
CSR is more negatively related with firm systematic
risk in firms with greater product differentiation, we
interact firm CSR with the Advertising variable (speci-
fications 5 and 6 of Table 2). In both specifications, the
coefficients on the interaction terms have the predicted
signs and are statistically significant at the 5% level or
better. For a firm with average advertising expenditure
of 0.01 (see Table 1), the absolute value of the coeffi-
cient of CSR on firm risk is larger by 0.098 (0.049) for
CSR1 (CSR2) than that of a zero-advertising firm. This
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Table 2. Beta Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Firm beta
CSR variable included in the regression CSR1 CSR2 CSR1 CSR2 CSR1 CSR2
lagged CSR variable −0.945∗∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗ −0.377∗∗∗ −0.139∗ −0.227 −0.070
(−5.681) (−4.836) (−2.790) (−1.957) (−1.557) (−0.902)
lagged advertising× lagged CSR −9.828∗∗∗ −4.949∗∗
(−2.627) (−2.396)
lagged advertising −0.552∗∗∗ −0.567∗∗∗ −0.522∗∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗
(−2.915) (−2.993) (−2.833) (−3.112)
lagged operating leverage −0.018 −0.018 −0.017 −0.017
(−1.204) (−1.200) (−1.179) (−1.178)
lagged R&D 0.635∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗
(5.106) (5.046) (5.106) (5.046)
lagged leverage 0.133∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(1.998) (2.026) (2.016) (2.040)
lagged CAPEX 0.216 0.213 0.218 0.214
(1.449) (1.426) (1.461) (1.434)
lagged cash 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(2.236) (2.221) (2.253) (2.240)
lagged size −0.035∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(−3.837) (−4.072) (−3.836) (−4.056)
lagged earnings variability 0.042∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(6.822) (6.848) (6.805) (6.833)
lagged diversification −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(−0.970) (−0.966) (−0.982) (−0.968)
lagged state tax −0.202 −0.205 −0.211 −0.213
(−1.473) (−1.495) (−1.541) (−1.556)
Year and industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm-years 28,578 28,578 25,073 25,073 25,073 25,073
Adj. R2 0.135 0.133 0.188 0.187 0.188 0.188
Notes. This table reports the results of panel regressions of firm beta on two CSR measures under several specifications:
without firm controls (specifications 1 and 2), with firm controls (specifications 3 and 4), and with CSR measures
interacted with lagged advertising (specifications 5 and 6). The CSR measure used in the regression is indicated on top
of each specification. The sample is from 2004 to 2015. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by firm and year. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The appendix contains a detailed
description of all the variables.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
is a significant increase in economic magnitude by 43%
(71%) from the absolute value of the coefficient of 0.227
(0.070) for CSR1 (CSR2) for a zero-advertising firm.11
6.3. Endogeneity in the CSR–Risk Relation
One concern with our analysis, and in fact with most
other studies of CSR, is that of endogeneity. Consider
the following mechanism for reverse causality in the
CSR-risk relation. Hong et al. (2012) present evidence
suggestive that financially constrained firms are less
likely to spend resources on CSR and that, when these
firms’ financial constraints are relaxed, spending on
CSR increases consistent with the slack hypothesis
of Waddock and Graves (1997).12 Extending the slack
hypothesis, it may be that firms with low levels of sys-
tematic risk have higher valuations andmore resources
to spend in CSR or have fewer growth options and
again more resources to dedicate to CSR. Another
mechanism for reverse causality occurs if firms that tra-
ditionally build customer loyalty through advertising
and, thus, have lower systematic risk also invest more
in CSR. Finally, firmswith a low level of systematic risk
or higher valuation may be in industries that are more
prone to developing more intensive CSR policies.
To alleviate these concerns, we proceed in two ways.
First, we control for a long list of (lagged) variables
that capture some of the effects. For example, when
we control for Cash, CAPEX, and R&D, we partially
control for the slack hypothesis. When we control
for Advertising and R&D, we control for the other
types of investment in customer loyalty. Industry fixed
effects capture unobserved industry characteristics that
can be correlated with the error term and result in
endogeneity.
Second, we deal with endogeneity by instrumenting
for CSR. The instrument we use builds on a literature
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Table 3. IV Regressions for Firm Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable CSR1 Firm beta CSR2 Firm beta CSR1 Firm beta CSR2 Firm beta
Regression stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
President vote, Democrats 0.037∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(3.201) (3.189) (3.011) (2.373)
Congress, Democrats 0.008∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.002 0.000
(2.635) (2.334) (0.313) (0.006)
State government, Democrats −0.004∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(−2.777) (−2.917) (−3.749) (−4.149)
instrumented CSR −0.706 −0.419 −1.239 −0.675
(−0.623) (−0.707) (−0.570) (−0.580)
instrumented CSR −20.482∗∗ −9.088∗ −28.349∗∗∗ −16.422∗∗∗
× lagged advertising (−2.181) (−1.821) (−2.785) (−2.680)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Number of firm-years 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000
Adj. R2 0.216 0.204 0.185 0.204 0.192 0.158 0.144 0.158
Weak instruments test, F-stat. 20.380 19.341 17.758 15.302
Notes. This table reports the results of instrumental variable (IV) estimation for firm beta. The endogenous (instrumented) variable is the
CSR measure. The instruments for CSR are based on the firm’s headquarters’ state political environment. President vote, Democrats is the
proportion of votes received by the Democratic candidate for presidential election. Congress, Democrats is 0.5 × proportion of senators who
are Democrats + 0.5 × proportion of representatives who are Democrats. State government, Democrats is 0.5 × dummy if a governor is a
Democrat+0.25×dummy if upper chamber is controlled by Democrats+0.25×dummy if lower chamber is controlled by Democrats. The CSR
measure used in the regression is indicated on top of each first stage regression. The sample is from 2004 to 2015. Specifications 1 to 4 (5 to 8)
include industry and year fixed effects (industry fixed effects only). Each regression includes all of the control variables as in specifications 3
and 4 in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The Kleibergen–Paap rank Wald
F-statistics (weak instruments test) are reported for the first-stage regressions. The appendix contains a detailed description of all the variables.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
that argues that democratic-leaning voters tend to care
more about CSR issues. The instrument we use is the
political affiliation of the state where the company is
headquartered. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) find
that firms headquartered in Democratic party–leaning
states are more likely to spend resources on CSR.
Gromet et al. (2013) demonstrate that more politically
conservative individuals are less in favor of investment
in energy-efficient technology than are those who are
more politically liberal (see also Costa and Kahn 2013).
When the electorate is more Democratic, companies
may be more susceptible to pressure from activists to
adopt CSR policies (for activist pressure and CSR, see
Baron 2001).13 Specifically, we use the following vari-
ables to instrument for CSR: President vote, democrats is
the proportion of votes in each state received by the
Democratic candidate for president; Congress, democrat
captures House and Senate Democratic representation
from each state; and State government, Democrats cap-
tures state chambers’ representation by Democrats (see
Appendix A.1 for details). We include industry fixed
effects in all our regressions so that the explanatory
variation for our regressions comes from states becom-
ing more or less Democratic over time. Given that year
fixed effects may absorb excessively the time varia-
tion in our political instruments, we report results both
with and without year fixed effects.14
Table 3 reports the results of the IV estimation.
Columns (1) to (4) present results with industry and
year fixed effects. In the first stage regressions reported
in columns (1) and (3), we regress firm CSR on the
instruments and all the control variables with industry
and year fixed effects. As expected, firms headquar-
tered in more Democratic-leaning states have higher
CSR scores with the first and the second instru-
ments being statistically significantly positive. The
third instrument is statistically significantly negative
because of its correlation with the other instruments,
but note that it would display a positive coefficient
if it were used without the other two instruments.15
In the second stage regressions reported in columns
(2) and (4), we use the fitted values of CSR and its
interaction with advertising expenditure as indepen-
dent regressors to explain firm systematic risk. In both
specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms
have the predicted signs and are statistically signifi-
cant. For a firm with average advertising expenditure,
the absolute value of the coefficient of CSR on firm risk
is larger by 0.205 (0.091) for CSR1 (CSR2) than that of
a zero-advertising firm. This is a significant increase in
economic magnitude by 29% (22%) from the absolute
value of the coefficient of 0.706 (0.419) for CSR1 (CSR2)
for a zero-advertising firm. Results are similar with-
out year fixed effects (see columns (5) to (8)). In both
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specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms
are statistically significant at the 1% level.
We run two specification tests. First, we run a weak
instruments test allowing for clustered errors. The first-
stage regression of CSR on the political instruments
and other exogenous variables produces a Kleibergen–
Paap rank Wald F-statistic of joint significance of the
excluded instruments of 20.380 (19.341) for column (1)
((3)), indicating that the excluded, political instruments
are relevant (and similarly for the other specifica-
tions). Second, we runHansen’s test of over-identifying
restrictions that tests for the exogeneity of the instru-
ments while allowing for clustered errors. We cannot
calculate the Hansen’s J-statistic for specifications with
time and industry fixed effects. For the specifications
without time fixed effects, Hansen’s J-statistic is 1.307
(1.293) for instrumenting CSR1 (CSR2), which is statis-
tically insignificant with p-value at 0.520 (0.524), indi-
cating that our instruments satisfy the over-identifying
restrictions. While a definite test of exogeneity does
not exist (e.g., Roberts and Whited 2012), these results
Table 4. Tobin’s Q Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Tobin’s Q
CSR variable included in the regression CSR1 CSR2 CSR1 CSR2 CSR1 CSR2
lagged CSR variable 0.894∗ 0.531∗∗ 2.362∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 1.821∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(1.806) (2.032) (5.898) (5.107) (4.687) (3.626)
lagged advertising× lagged CSR 35.611∗∗ 20.557∗∗∗
(2.536) (2.743)
lagged advertising 4.413∗∗∗ 4.477∗∗∗ 4.304∗∗∗ 4.538∗∗∗
(4.784) (4.849) (4.796) (5.038)
lagged operating leverage 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.141) (0.133) (0.094) (0.085)
lagged R&D 3.917∗∗∗ 3.945∗∗∗ 3.912∗∗∗ 3.939∗∗∗
(9.195) (9.259) (9.208) (9.275)
lagged leverage −0.006 −0.014 −0.009 −0.016
(−0.049) (−0.122) (−0.076) (−0.146)
lagged CAPEX 1.877∗∗∗ 1.890∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗∗
(5.274) (5.288) (5.244) (5.257)
lagged cash 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(5.569) (5.581) (5.537) (5.543)
lagged size −0.100∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
(−7.787) (−7.402) (−7.840) (−7.486)
lagged earnings variability −0.049∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(−5.882) (−5.988) (−5.802) (−5.912)
lagged diversification −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(−2.029) (−2.022) (−2.028) (−2.039)
lagged state tax −0.105 −0.094 −0.074 −0.062
(−0.205) (−0.182) (−0.145) (−0.121)
Year and industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm-years 28,578 28,578 25,073 25,073 25,073 25,073
Adj. R2 0.168 0.169 0.287 0.286 0.288 0.287
Notes. This table reports the results of panel regressions of Tobin’s Q on two CSR measures under several specifications:
without firm controls (specifications 1 and 2), with firm controls (specifications 3 and 4), and with CSR measures
interacted with lagged advertising (specifications 5 and 6). The CSR measure used in the regression is indicated on top
of each specification. The sample is from 2004 to 2015. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by firm and year. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The appendix contains a detailed
description of all the variables.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
together with our attempts at dealing with the poten-
tial violations of the exclusion restriction suggest that
our overall results survive the endogeneity concerns.
6.4. Firm Value and CSR
Table 4 presents the results of the tests that firm-level
CSR is associated with higher firm valuation as mea-
sured by Tobin’s Q. Specifications 1 and 2 show that
firm value increases with CSR for both CSR measures.
In specifications 3 and 4, we include CSR together with
the firm controls. In terms of economic significance,
specifications 3 and 4 reveal that a one standard devi-
ation increase in CSR1 (CSR2) increases Tobin’s Q by
0.087 (0.073), which is a 5% (4%) increase relative to
the average Tobin’s Q of 1.885 (from Table 1). When we
interact firm CSR with the Advertising variable (spec-
ifications 5 and 6), the coefficients on the interaction
terms have the predicted signs and are statistically
significant at the 5% level or better. For a firm with
average advertising expenditure, the absolute value of
the coefficient of CSR on firm value is larger by 0.356
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Table 5. IV Regressions for Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable CSR1 Tobin’s Q CSR2 Tobin’s Q CSR1 Tobin’s Q CSR2 Tobin’s Q
Regression stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
President vote, Democrats 0.037∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(3.201) (3.189) (3.011) (2.373)
Congress, Democrats 0.008∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.002 0.000
(2.635) (2.334) (0.313) (0.006)
State government, Democrats −0.004∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(−2.777) (−2.917) (−3.749) (−4.149)
instrumented CSR 2.639 1.347 0.103 0.040
(0.661) (0.647) (0.017) (0.013)
instrumented CSR× lagged advertising 110.872∗∗ 63.905∗∗∗ 101.750∗ 66.444∗∗
(2.505) (3.014) (1.959) (2.303)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Number of firm-years 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000
Adj. R2 0.216 0.311 0.185 0.311 0.192 0.282 0.144 0.282
Weak instruments test, F-stat. 20.380 19.341 17.758 15.302
Notes. This table reports the results of instrumental variable (IV) estimation for Tobin’s Q. The endogenous (instrumented) variable is the
CSR measure. The instruments for CSR are based on the firm’s headquarters’ state political environment. President vote, Democrats is the
proportion of votes received by the Democratic candidate for presidential election. Congress, Democrats is 0.5 × proportion of senators who
are Democrats + 0.5 × proportion of representatives who are Democrats. State government, Democrats is 0.5 × dummy if a governor is a
Democrat+0.25×dummy if upper chamber is controlled by Democrats+0.25×dummy if lower chamber is controlled by Democrats. The CSR
measure used in the regression is indicated on top of each first stage regression. The sample is from 2004 to 2015. Specifications 1 to 4 (5 to 8)
include industry and year fixed effects (industry fixed effects only). Each regression includes all of the control variables as in specifications 3
and 4 in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The Kleibergen–Paap rank Wald
F-statistics (weak instruments test) are reported for the first stage regressions. The appendix contains a detailed description of all the variables.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(0.206) for CSR1 (CSR2) than that of a zero-advertising
firm. This is a significant increase in economic magni-
tude by 20% (28%) from the coefficient of 1.821 (0.725)
for CSR1 (CSR2) for a zero-advertising firm.
Table 5 presents the IV estimation of firm value on
CSR. To conduct this test, we again use the political
affiliation of the state where the firm is headquartered.
Note also that if Democratic states have higher taxes as
shown by Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), our political
instruments may be correlated with firm value. How-
ever, according toDiGiuli andKostovetsky (2014), firms
do more CSR in Democratic states, which then should
lead to higher firm value, not lower firm value as should
be the case according to the tax story. Nonetheless, our
regressions include state taxes to account for any omit-
ted correlation. Continuing our discussion of exclusion
restrictions, itmaybeargued that technologyfirmswith
high growth options have low firm risk and are also
more likely to both invest in CSR and to locate in Sili-
con Valley or in Boston, which are located in tradition-
ally Democratic states. However, since we use industry
fixed effects in both stages of our IV estimation, geo-
graphic clusteringof industries shouldnot be a concern.
Moreover, the argument goes against the evidence in
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) that suggests that
high growth options firms have high betas.
The results in Table 5 show that instrumented CSR
has a positive and significant effect over firm value as
predicted by the theory (the table repeats the first-stage
regressions from Table 3). In columns (2) and (4) with
industry and year fixed effects, the coefficients on the
interaction terms have the predicted signs and are sta-
tistically significant. For a firm with average advertis-
ing expenditure, the coefficient of CSR on firm value is
larger by 1.109 (0.639) for CSR1 (CSR2) than that of a
zero-advertising firm. This is a significant increase in
economic magnitude by 42% (47%) from the coefficient
of 2.639 (1.347) for CSR1 (CSR2) for a zero-advertising
firm. Again, given that year fixed effects may absorb
the time variation in the political instruments exces-
sively, we report results also without year fixed effects
(see columns (6) and (8)). Overall the results are similar
to those with year fixed effects. As with the IV regres-
sions of beta, we can only calculate Hansen’s J-statistic
that allows for clustered errors when we drop the
time fixed effects. Hansen’s J-statistic for instrument-
ing CSR1 (CSR2) is 1.364 (1.262), which is statisti-
cally insignificant with p-value at 0.506 (0.532), indi-
cating that our instruments satisfy the over-identifying
restrictions.
6.5. CSR and Cyclicality of Profits
This subsection offers evidence in support of proposi-
tion 3. Our results provide corroborating evidence for
the mechanism studied in this paper because if CSR
firms have lower exposure to aggregate shocks and
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consequently lower systematic risk, then their profits
should be less cyclical, that is, less sensitive to changes
in GDP.
Table 6 presents panel regressions of changes in firm
profitability on GDP growth and GDP growth interacted
with CSR. We measure changes in firm profitability
with year-on-year changes in ROA (return on assets)
and use the two CSR measures, CSR1 and CSR2. We
show results without firm controls (specifications 1
and 2) and with firm controls (specifications 3 and 4).
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.
The presence of year fixed effects implies that GDP
growth is omitted from the regression. As predicted
by the model, the interaction between CSR and GDP
growth is negative and statistically significant. The
Table 6. Profitability Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Change in ROA
CSR variable included CSR1 CSR2 CSR1 CSR2
in the regression
CSR variable 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.004
(0.992) (0.944) (0.746) (0.866)
CSR×GDP growth −0.016∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(−2.052) (−2.590) (−2.610) (−3.354)
lagged advertising −0.004 −0.004
(−0.273) (−0.275)
lagged operating leverage 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(1.919) (1.918)
lagged R&D 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(2.726) (2.722)
lagged leverage 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(2.880) (2.881)
lagged CAPEX −0.074∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(−3.291) (−3.279)
lagged cash −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(−5.725) (−5.735)
lagged size −0.000 −0.000
(−0.167) (−0.191)
lagged earnings 0.000 0.000
variability (0.333) (0.334)
lagged diversification 0.000 0.000
(1.016) (1.023)
lagged state tax 0.009 0.009
(0.626) (0.631)
Year and industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firm-years 24,300 24,300 21,662 21,662
Adj. R2 0.021 0.021 0.033 0.033
Notes. This table reports the results of panel regressions of changes
in ROA (return on assets) from the previous year on two CSR mea-
sures under several specifications: without firm controls (specifica-
tions 1 and 2) and with firm controls (specifications 3 and 4). The
CSR measure used in the regression is indicated on top of each spec-
ification and is interacted with GDP growth. The sample is from 2004
to 2015. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by firm and year. The numbers in paren-
theses are t-statistics. The appendix contains a detailed description
of all the variables.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
results show that changes in ROA co-move less with
GDP growth for firms with higher levels of CSR.
7. Conclusion
This paper studies a mechanism through which CSR
policies affect firms’ systematic risk based on the
premise that CSR is a product differentiation strat-
egy. Our theory and evidence provide evidence that
consumers are important agents in influencing firm
policies and their risk profiles, in line with recent CEO
survey evidence showing that consumers are more
important than investors in determining firms’ CSR
policies. This paper, thus, fills a gap in the literature
by formalizing and testing a channel through which
CSR policies affect firm systematic risk and value. The
paper also contributes to the literature by offering an
instrumental variables estimation that attempts to deal
with potential endogeneity of CSR.
Modeling consumers that are heterogenous in
wealth and where CSR goods are superior goods is
a potential avenue for extending our CSR model. We
believe that such a model would offer similar predic-
tions to our current model, if wealthy consumers, who
buy the superior CSR goods, have also more stable
demands across the business cycle. Moreover, we rec-
ognize that not all CSR activities are geared toward cus-
tomer loyalty. In a richer model, it would be interesting
to study the relationship between CSR and employee
loyalty and the implications of that relationship.
Our results have practical capital budgeting, portfo-
lio selection, and policy implications. Beta is the major
parameter used in estimating the cost of equity. Given
our results on beta, companies with higher CSR have
lower cost of equity. Also, the choice of securities to
include in a portfolio relies partly on the degree to
which the securities co-move with the market. Includ-
ing stocks with higher CSR would have the effect of
lowering the overall riskiness of the portfolio. In addi-
tion, projects that increase firms’ reputation for CSR
should be discounted with lower cost of equity com-
pared with otherwise similar projects. However, our
theory cautions that the benefits from investing in CSR
are tied to the proportion of firms already engaging in
CSR relative to the total demand for CSR. Thus, we do
not intend to claim that investing in CSR is in the best
interest of all firms or at all times.
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Appendix
The appendix contains proofs of the propositions in the
paper.
A.1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the date 2 investor opti-
mization problem:
max
cl
C1−γ2
1− γ ,
subject to the budget constraint,
W2 
∫ 1
0
pici di. (A.1)
Letting λ2 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with Equa-
tion (A.1). The first-order sufficient and necessary conditions
for an interior solution are Equations (A.1) and
αC−γ2
(∫ µ
0
cσGi di
)α/σG−1 (∫ 1
µ
cσPi di
) (1−α)/σP
cσG−1l  λ2pl ,
all 0 ≤ l ≤ µ,
(1− α)C−γ2
(∫ µ
0
cσGi di
)α/σG (∫ 1
µ
cσPj dj
) (1−α)/σP−1
cσP−1k  λ2pk ,
all µ ≤ k ≤ 1.
Multiplying both sides of the equations by the respective con-
sumption level and integrating over the relevant range gives
αC1−γ2  λ2
∫ µ
0
pici di ,
(1− α)C1−γ2  λ2
∫ 1
µ
p jc j dj.
Eliminating λ2, we see that α is the expenditure share of CSR
goods: ∫ µ
0
pici di 
α
1− α
∫ 1
µ
p jc j dj.
Also, C1−γ2  λ2W2. Take the ratio of two conditions for 0 ≤ i,
l ≤ µ to get
ci 
(
pi
pl
)1/(σG−1)
cl , (A.2)
and the ratio of two conditions for µ ≤ j, k ≤ 1 to get
c j 
( p j
pk
)1/(σP−1)
ck . (A.3)
Replacing (A.2) and (A.3) back in the first-order conditions
αC−γ2
(∫ µ
0
pσG/(σG−1)i di
)α/σG−1
·
(∫ 1
µ
p(σP )/σP−1i
) (1−α)/σP
p(1−α)/σG−1l c
α−1
l p
−(1−α)/(σP−1)
k c
1−α
k  λ2 ,
(1− α)C−γ2
(∫ µ
0
pσG/σG−1i
)α/σG
·
(∫ 1
µ
pσP/(σP−1)j dj
) (1−α−σP )/σP
p−α/(σG−1)l c
α
l p
α/(σP−1)
k c
−α
k  λ2.
The ratio of these two equations yields
α
(∫ 1
µ
pσP/(σP−1)i
)
(1− α)(∫ µ0 pσG/(σG−1)i ) p
1/(σG−1)
l
p1/(σP−1)k
ck  cl .
Replacing all in the budget constraint
W2 
∫
pici

∫ µ
0
pi
(
pi
pl
)1/(σG−1)
cl di +
∫ 1
µ
p j
( p j
pk
)1/(σP−1)
ck dj

1
1− α
(∫ 1
µ
pσP/(σP−1)i
)
ck
p1/(σP−1)k
,
from which we get the demand functions
ck  (1− α)
p1/(σP−1)k∫ 1
µ
pσP/(σP−1)i di
W2 ,
and
cl  α
p1/(σG−1)l∫ µ
0 p
σG/(σG−1)
i di
W2.
Turn now to the firms’ problems. Using the demand func-
tions from the investor’s problem, the first-order necessary
and sufficient conditions for firms are
σGp jx j  wAx j
σPpkxk  wAxk
so that profits are
pi j  (1− σ j)p jx j .
By Walras’ law, the equilibrium requires a price normal-
ization. We normalize prices such that the price level of the
aggregate consumption good equals 1. Define
P  min
cl∈{cl :C21}
∫ 1
0
plcl dl.
It can be shown that the solution yields
P  α−α(1− α)−(1−α)
(∫ µ
0
pσG/(σG−1)i di
)−α((1−σG )/σG )
·
(∫ 1
µ
pσP/(σP−1)k dk
)−(1−α)((1−σP )/σP )
.
If P  1, and setting pk  pP for all k ∈ [µ, 1] and pl  pG for all
l ∈ [0, µ], then
pP  (αµ(1−σG )/σG )α((1− α)(1− µ)(1−σP )/σP )(1−α)
(
pG
pP
)−α
.
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From the firms’ problem
pP
pG

σG
σP
,
and we arrive at
pP  p¯ ,
pG 
σP
σG
p¯ ,
where
p¯  (αµ(1−σG )/σG )α((1− α)(1− µ)(1−σP )/σP )(1−α)
(
σP
σG
)−α
.
By construction, this solution obeys P  1.
Now we solve the labor market clearing condition. From
the investor’s problem,
cG 
α(1− µ)
(1− α)µ
pP
pG
cP

α(1− µ)
(1− α)µ
σG
σP
cP . (A.4)
Replacing these expressions in the labor market clearing con-
dition, ∫10 li di  L, gives
µAcG + (1− µ)AcP  L.
Using Equation (A.4) again
cP  x¯
1− α
1− µA
−1 (A.5)
cG  x¯
σG
σP
α
µ
A−1 , (A.6)
where
x¯ 
LσP
ασG + (1− α)σP .
We then use one of the first-order conditions from the firms’
problem to get the wage rate,
w  p¯σPA
−1.
Profits are
piG  p¯ x¯(1− σG)αµA
−1 ,
for CSR firms and
piP  p¯ x¯(1− σP)1− α1− µA
−1 ,
for non-CSR firms. Finally, under our price normalization,
C2 W2, and
λ2  C
−γ
2  [p¯ x¯]−γAγ1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. This proposition discusses condi-
tions under which µ < τP , in terms of exogenous model
parameters. Note that the expenditure shares of CSR and
non-CSR goods are α and 1− α, respectively, so that
µpGcG 
α
1− α (1− µ)pPcP .
Because operating profits are pi j  (1− σ j)p jc j , the difference
in profits piG − piP is proportional to
∆≡ (1− σG)αµ − (1− σP)
1− α
1− µ . (A.7)
Inserting this result into the equilibrium condition (12)
proves that the sign of µ − τP (or τG − τP) is given only by
the sign of ∆. This result is helpful in isolating the effect of
demand loyalty on systematic risk studied in this paper.
To show the main result in the proposition, note that
∆ > 0 iff (1− σG)α
1− σP + (σP − σG)α > µ.
The left-hand side of the inequality is strictly increasing in
α varying between 0 and 1. Define α¯ implicitly as
(1− σG)α¯
1− σP + (σP − σG)α¯  τP .
We can solve for α¯ to get the expression in the proposition.
Let α < α¯ and assume by way of contradiction that µ > τP .
Then, by definition of α¯,
τP >
(1− σG)α
1− σP + (σP − σG)α .
But, µ > τP , or equivalently, ∆> 0, implies that the right-hand
side of this inequality is larger than µ, which is a contradic-
tion. Now, let µ < τP . Then,
(1− σG)α
1− σP + (σP − σG)α < µ < τP 
(1− σG)α¯
1− σP + (σP − σG)α¯ .
The inequalities imply α < α¯. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Write Rpi using the equilibrium val-
ues of pi j and noting that µ  τ∗G :
Rpi 
(1− σG)(α/µ)p¯ x¯A−1 − µ(1+ r)
(1− σP)((1− α)/(1− µ))p¯ x¯A−1 − τP(1+ r) .
Before continuing, note that stock prices are
Q j  E[mpi j] − τ j
 m¯[p¯ x¯]1−γ(1− σ j)
α j
µ j
E[A−(1−γ)] − τ j . (A.8)
At an interior solution, the price of the marginal CSR firm
obeys Q∗G QP , which can be written as
m¯[p¯ x¯]1−γE[A−(1−γ)]∆ τ∗G − τP , (A.9)
where we have used the definition of ∆ in Equation (A.7).
Now take the derivative of Rpi with respect to A−1 :
dRpi
dA−1
 (1+ r)p¯ x¯−(1− σG)(α/µ)τP +µ(1− σP)(1−α)/(1−µ)[(1− σP)(1−α)/(1−µ)p¯ x¯A−1− τP(1+ r)]2
∝−(1− σG)αµ τP +µ(1− σP)
1−α
1−µ
 (1− σG)αµ (µ− τP)−µ∆

{
(1− σG)αµ m¯[p¯ x¯]
1−γE[A−(1−γ)]−µ
}
∆
Q∗G∆.
The third line uses the definition of∆ and combines the terms
with (1 − σG)(α/µ). The fourth line uses equation (A.9) to
eliminate µ− τP , and the last line uses the equilibrium value
ofQ∗G in Equation (A.8). It follows that dRpi/dA−1 R 0 iff,∆R 0.
From (A.9), and noting that µ  τ∗G in equilibrium, then ∆R 0
iff τP − µ S 0. From Proposition 2, τP − µ S 0 iff α¯ S α. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that the gross return on firm i
is defined as 1 + ri ≡ (pii − τi(1 + r))/Qi and that the value-
weighted market return is 1+ rM ≡ ∫(pii − τi(1+ r)) di/∫Q j dj.
We wish to solve for β j  Cov(r j , rM)/Var(rM). Consider first
solving for Cov(r j , rM). Because τi and r are constants,
Cov(r j , rM)Cov
(
pi j
Q j
,
∫
pii
Qi
Qi∫
Ql dl
di
)
.
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Taking Q j ∫Ql dl out of the covariance operator and sub-
stituting in for the value of pii gives
Cov(r j , rM)

(p¯ x¯(1− σ j)(α j/µ j))
( ∫
p¯ x¯(1− σi)(αi/µi) di
)
Q j
∫
Q j dj
Var(A−1).
Consider now solving for Var(rM). Following similar steps,
Var(rM)
( ∫
p¯ x¯(1− σi)(αi/µi) di
)2( ∫
Q j dj
)2 Var(A−1).
Thus,
β j 
p¯ x¯(1− σ j)(α j/µ j)
Q j
[ ∫ p¯ x¯(1− σi)(αi/µi) di∫
Qi di
]−1
or solving the integral
β j 
(1− σ j)α j
(1− σG)αG + (1− σP)αP
∫
Qi di
µ jQ j
. (A.10)
For completeness, calculate the total stock market value:∫
Qi di 
∫ µ
0
Qi di + (1− µ)QP

∫ µ
0
(E(mpiG) − τGi) di + (1− µ)QP .
Note that ∫µ0 τGi di  12µ2 and E(mpiG)  Q∗G + τ∗G  Q∗G + µ.
Therefore, ∫
Qi di Q
∗
G +
1
2µ
2.
Using (A.8) and (A.10), we get
β j 
(1− σ j)α j
m¯[p¯ x¯]1−γ(1− σ j)(α j/µ j)E[A−(1−γ)] − τ j
·
∫
Qi di
µ j[(1− σG)αG + (1− σP)αP] ,
from which we get that β j is increasing in σ j , holding all else
constant. 
Proof of Result in Endnote 8. Using the Euler equation, we
obtain
E(r j − r)−E(m)−1Cov(m , r j)
−E(m)−1Q−1j Cov(m , pi j).
The expected excess return is determined by the covari-
ance of the stock return with the inter-temporal marginal
rate of substitution, Cov(m , r j). This covariance depends on
how aggregate productivity affects both variables. We now
prove that
Proposition 5. Firm j’s equilibrium expected excess stock
return is
E(r j−r)
p¯ x¯(1−σ j)(α j/µ j)
m¯[p¯ x¯]1−γ(1−σ j)(α j/µ j)E[Aγ−1]−τ j
−Cov(A−1 ,Aγ)
E(Aγ) .
(A.11)
The expected excess return is increasing in σ j . Furthermore, at an
interior solution for µ, the marginal CSR firm has
E(rP − r) > E(r∗G − r) iff α¯ > α.
Proof of Proposition 5. The investor’s stochastic discount
factor is
m  m¯[p¯ x¯]−γAγ .
Then, we have
Cov(m , pi j)Cov
(
m¯[p¯ x¯]−γAγ , p¯ x¯(1− σ j)
α j
µ j
A−1
)
 m¯[p¯ x¯]1−γ(1− σ j)
α j
µ j
Cov(Aγ ,A−1).
Using Equation (A.9), and substituting in the various terms,
expected stock excess returns for firm j are
E(r j − r)
p¯ x¯(1− σ j)(α j/µ j)
m¯[p¯ x¯]1−γ(1− σ j)(α j/µ j)E[A−(1−γ)] − τ j
· −Cov(A
γ ,A−1)
E(Aγ) .
For any CSR firm, the ratio of expected excess returns to that
of a non-CSR firm is
E(rG − r)
E(rP − r) 
(1− σG)(α/µ)
(1− σP)((1− α)/(1− µ))
QP
QG
.
The marginal CSR firm
E(r∗G − r)
E(rP − r)  1+
∆
(1− σP)((1− α)/(1− µ)) .
Therefore,
E(rP − r)R E(r∗G − r) if and only if τP − µ R 0.
From Proposition 2, τP − µ S 0 iff α¯ S α. 
The proposition gives an expression for firm j’s expected
excess return. The first term in the expression gives the profit
sensitivity to the aggregate shock. It amplifies the term
Cov(A−1 ,Aγ) that captures how profits covary with the
stochastic discount factor. This covariance is negative for any
risk aversion parameter γ > 0, and thus, E(r j − r) > 0. If
investors are risk neutral, that is, γ  0, then Cov(A−1 ,Aγ) 0
and E(r j − r) 0.
Holding µ constant, E(r j − r) increases with σ j . Intuitively,
lower σ j reduces the sensitivity of the firm’s net profits to
aggregate shocks. Such a firm has relatively higher payoffs in
states of lower consumption and high marginal utility and is,
thus, less risky to a risk-averse investor and worth more.
The lower price elasticity of demand, by increasing firm
profits and stock prices, produces a feedback equilibrium
effect via an increase in the proportion of CSR firms, µ. The
proposition gives a stark result regarding the equilibrium
riskiness of CSR versus non-CSR firms.We show that the pro-
portion of CSR firms determines the relative riskiness of CSR
versus non-CSR firms: if µ ≤ τP (or α ≤ α¯), then the marginal
CSR firm has E(r∗G − r) ≤ E(rP − r). In this case, infra-marginal
CSR firms also have higher prices and lower expected returns
than non-CSR firms. Therefore, if µ ≤ τP , then on average
CSR firms have lower expected excess returns. When µ > τP
(or α > α¯), then E(rP − r) < E(r∗G − r) and the marginal CSR
firm has higher adoption costs, profit sensitivity, and system-
atic risk than non-CSR firms. By continuity, infra-marginal
firms with costs close to τ∗G  µ also have higher expected
returns, but there may be firms with low enough τGi such
that E(rP − r) > E(rGi − r).
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Endnotes
1The 2013UNGlobal Compact-Accenture CEOStudy on Sustainabil-
ity of over 1,000 CEOs listed brand, trust, and reputation, together
with consumers as their primary motivations to engage in CSR activ-
ities. Investors have also recognized the importance of CSR initiatives
(Hayward et al. 2013). Already in 1970 the landmark court decision
Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC opened the door for
CSR proposals to be included in proxy statements (Glac 2014). Start-
ing in the 1990s, the Global Reporting Initiative, later in partnership
with the UN Environment Program and the OECD, has been offer-
ing corporations a standardized reporting framework for their CSR
activities.
2For a review, see Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012).
3Gourio and Rudanko (2014) provide micro-foundations for our
reduced-form way of assuming lower price elasticity of demand for
CSR goods. In Gourio and Rudanko, search frictions in the goods
markets create long-term customer relationships that are slow to
adjust, that is, customer loyalty.
4Weview α as capturing the expenditure that comes from consumers
that actively seek out CSR goods independently of their income.
High-income consumers may have a higher demand for CSR goods,
but if CSR is viewed by them as a luxury, then their demand for CSR
would be strongly procylical even if in general their overall demand
for goods is less sensitive to the business cycle.
5 Instead of assuming an adoption cost, an equivalent formalization
of the choice that firms face is to assume that there is an idiosyncratic
disaster shock at date 2 that reduces τ(1+ r) of the profits of non-CSR
firms with probability ω after trading has occurred. With probability
1 − ω, no disaster occurs. The expected disaster loss is denoted by
τP  ωτ in units of date 1 consumption. To avoid this uncertainty, a
firm can adopt the G technology at a cost τGi paid at date 1.
6We have solved the model with the more general production func-
tion li Aηi κixi , allowing for firm-level heterogeneity in the sensitiv-
ity to aggregate shocks and in the unit cost of labor. We obtain the
same results regarding CSR and systematic risk.
7We have verified numerical existence of an interior solution for µ.
8Using Equations (10) and (11), we obtain the usual pricing condition
in a consumption-CAPM, which allow us to state expected excess
returns as a function of Cov(m , pi j). The appendix shows that, at an
interior solution for µ, the marginal CSR firm has E(rP − r)> E(r∗G− r)
iff α¯ > α. Expected excess returns increase with σG as well.
9MSCI ESG’s data coverage prior to 2003 is limited. It covers about
1,100 firms in 2001 and 2002 and 650 firms from 1991 to 2000.
10KLD and then MSCI ESG Research changed the rating methodol-
ogy over time. One of the main changes occurred in 2010 whenMSCI
took over KLD. Over time, too, the number of concerns and strengths
in some categories has changed. For example, the maximum possi-
ble number of strengths (concerns) for Microsoft was 32 (27) in 2003;
changed in 2006, 2010, 2012, and 2013; and are 36 (25) in 2014.
11The advertising data in Compustat has many missing observa-
tions, which we set to zero following the literature. Unfortunately,
these missing observations do not mean that the firms did not adver-
tise, but rather that firms did not report the item separately from
SG&A (selling, general and administrative expenses). This data defi-
ciency is likely to produce an attenuating bias against our findings.
If the no advertising firms indeed advertise, then it should be more
difficult to detect any differences between the two groups, yet the
differences persist.
12Note, however, that causationmay go the otherway around: Cheng
et al. (2014) provide evidence that CSR activities improve access to
finance and, thus, relax financing constraints.
13Cornett et al. (2016) provide evidence that firms respond to activist
and political pressure. Cornett et al. show that commercial banks
adopted CSR policies in the aftermath of the financial crisis as a
response to the criticism of being socially irresponsible prior to the
crisis.
14 It can be argued that firms may change their headquarter location
in response to changes in a state’s political attitude. In our sample,
less than 1% of firm-year observations come from companies that
changed the location of their headquarters between 1990 and 2005
based on Compustat’s data for the location of firms’ headquarters.
In the instrumental variables analysis, we exclude companies that
changed headquarter state during the prior 25 years.
15The results are not significantly affected if the third instrument is
removed.
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